Hassell v. Bird by California Supreme Court
S235968 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
 
DAWN L. HASSELL and HASSELL LAW GROUP, P.C., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
AVA BIRD, 
Defendant; 
YELP, INC., 
Appellant. 
 
After a Decision by the Court of Appeal 
First Appellate District, Division Four, Case No. A143233 
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of California, 
County of San Francisco, Case No. CGC-13-53025, 
The Honorable Donald J. Sullivan and the Honorable Ernest H. 
Goldsmith, presiding 
   
REVISED AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF EUGENE VOLOKH  
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT 
 
SCOTT & CYAN BANISTER FIRST AMENDMENT CLINIC 
UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW 
Eugene Volokh (Bar No. 194464) 
405 Hilgard Ave., Los Angeles, California 90095 
(310) 206-3926* 
 
 
* Amicus would like to thank Alexandra Gianelli, Kristin Hal-
sing, and Ashford Kneitel, UCLA School of Law students who 
worked on this brief. 
  
 2
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS 
Amicus is unaware of any entity or person who must be listed 
under Rule 8.208. 
DATED: May 18, 2017 Respectfully Submitted, 
 
By: s/ Eugene Volokh 
 Eugene Volokh 
 Amicus Curiae 
 
  
 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Certificate of Interested Entities or Persons ...................................2 
Table of Contents ..............................................................................3 
Table of Authorities ..........................................................................5 
Interest of Amicus Curiae ............................................................. 12 
Introduction and Summary of Argument ..................................... 12 
Argument ........................................................................................ 16 
I.  Stipulated Injunctions Involving Apparently Fake 
Defendants ............................................................................. 16 
A.  Smith v. Garcia .............................................................. 18 
B.  Patel v. Chan .................................................................. 21 
C.  California cases .............................................................. 23 
II.  Stipulated Injunctions Involving Fake Notarizations ......... 27 
III.  Injunctions Against a Defendant Who Likely Is Not the 
Real Author: The Government Document Cases ................. 30 
IV.  Injunctions Against a Defendant Who May Not Be the 
Real Author: The Out-of-State California Notarization 
Cases ....................................................................................... 35 
V.  Default Judgments Obtained Without Genuine Attempts 
at Locating Defendants ......................................................... 39 
VI.  Default or Stipulated Judgments Aimed at Deindexing 
Professional Media Articles ................................................... 43 
A.  Wag the Dog: Lawsuits Based on Allegedly 
Defamatory Comments .................................................. 43 
B.  Lying Then or Lying Now?: Attempts to Deindex 
Professional Media Articles Based on a Source’s 
Supposedly Recanting an Allegation ............................ 47 
C.  Bury the URL: Attempts to Deindex Professional 
Media Articles By Listing Them Within a Long List 
of Other URLs ................................................................ 51 
VII.  Apparent Forgeries ................................................................ 53 
VIII.  These Problems Cannot Be Solved by Requiring 
Internet Companies to Intervene to Challenge Suspicious 
Orders ..................................................................................... 57 
 4
IX.  Judicial Notice of Court Documents ..................................... 60 
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 63 
Appendix A. Lawsuits that Share Procedural and Textual 
features with Smith v. Garcia and Patel v. Chen ................ 66 
Appendix B. Apparent Forgeries .................................................. 70 
Certificate of Compliance .............................................................. 74 
Certificate of Service ...................................................................... 75 
 
 5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Amovious Networks v. Edwards, No. 2016-45988 
(Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ....................................................... 37 
ASIAUSA v. Williamson, No. CV-15-841465 (Ohio 
Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) .................................................... 37 
Aukerman v. Adams, No. 2013-33765-FMCI (Fla. 7th 
Cir. Ct. Volusia Cnty.) ................................................................ 56 
Ball v. Saurman, No. 56-2012-00518245-CU-DF-VTA 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Ventura Cnty.) ................................................. 49 
Bansal v. Kumar, No. V425852 (Md. Montgomery 
Cnty. Cir. Ct.) .............................................................................. 47 
BCI Property Management v. Ramos, No. 2016-29570 
(Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ....................................................... 36 
Blue Haven Nat’l Mgm’t v. Galvan, No. 2016CA2880 
(Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Duval Cnty.) ................................................... 38 
Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 764, 
248 P.3d 1170 ........................................................................ 61, 62 
California First Amend. Coalition v. Superior Court 
(1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 159 ........................................................ 62 
Callagy v. Roffman, No. 160603108 (Ct. Com. Pl. 
Phila. Cnty.) .......................................................................... 23, 39 
Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-021440-CA-01 (Fla. 11th 
Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cnty.) .................................................. 23, 26 
Chinnock v. Ivanski, No. CV2016-094256 (Ariz. 
Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty.)................................................... 28, 29 
Desert Palm Surgical Group v. Petta, No. CV2008-
010464 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty.) ................................. 51 
Dr-Max Limited v. Kahapeachow, No. CV-16-858256 
(Ohio Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) .......................................... 37 
Eccentric Holdings v. Largo, No. 2016-61892 (Tex. 
Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ................................................................ 36 
 6
Fertel v. Davidson, Civ. No. CCB-13-2922, 2013 WL 
6842890 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2013) ........................................... 30, 32 
Fertel v. Saul, No. 24-C-14-003049 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
Baltimore Cnty.) ................................................................... 31, 32 
Financial Rescue LLC v. Smith, No. 15-006119-CI 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas Cnty.) ...................................................... 20 
Flynn v. Garcia, No. A-13-676559-C (Nev. Dist. Ct. 
Clark Cnty.) ................................................................................. 51 
Fox  & Assocs. v. Wallace, No. 2016-06674 (Tex. 
Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ................................................................ 36 
Generational Equity, LLC v. Does #1–100, No. 401-
00232-2014, at 11–12 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Collin Cnty.) ................... 53 
Glatter v. Castle, No. 184324 (Cal. Super. Ct. Shasta 
Cnty.) ..................................................................................... 24, 25 
Glatter v. Castle, No. SC125890 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los 
Angeles Cnty.) ....................................................................... 25, 26 
Gossels Casting v. Dinsdale, No. CV-2015-05-2812 
(Ohio Summit Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) ............................................. 38 
Grisak Properties v. Baroro, No. 2016-46539 (Tex. 
Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ................................................................ 36 
Groza v. Handley, No. C-16-71540 (Md. Carroll Cnty. 
Cir. Ct.) ........................................................................................ 38 
Hassell v. Bird (2016) 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336 ............................. 16 
Holdren v. Ortega, No. 2016-49421 (Tex. Harris Cnty. 
Dist. Ct.) ...................................................................................... 36 
Intravas, Inc. v. Metcalf, No. CV2012-013872 (Ariz. 
Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty.)......................................................... 35 
Karosa v. Killian, No. A-12-670259-C (Nev. Dist. Ct. 
Clark Cnty.) ................................................................................. 34 
Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal. App. 
4th 267 ......................................................................................... 63 
Kosage v. Nelson, No. 2016-39989 (Tex. Harris Cnty. 
Dist. Ct.) ...................................................................................... 36 
 7
Kriss v. Reviewer, No. A1502350 (Ohio Hamilton 
Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) ...................................................................... 53 
Lyman v. Bernard, No. LC104275 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Los Angeles Cnty.) ................................................................ 23, 27 
Lynd v. Hood, No. CV2015-009398 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 
Maricopa Cnty.) .......................................................................... 29 
M&M Inc. v. Brooks, No. 2016-CA-001330 (Fla. 15th 
Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty.) ......................................................... 47 
MB Ventures v. Medina, No. DC-16-05087 (Tex. 
Dallas Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ................................................................ 37 
Med Link Networking Solutions v. Jones, No. 2016-
24479 (Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ............................................ 37 
Morton Regent Enterprises, Inc. v. Leadtec California, 
Inc. (1977) 74 Cal. App. 3d 842 .................................................. 59 
Murtagh v. Reynolds, No. 160901262 (Pa. Phila. Ct. 
Com. Pl.) ...................................................................................... 23 
Premiere Casting Events v. Valencia, No. 
16CV005975 (Ohio Franklin Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) ...................... 38 
RBJ Enters. v. Alexander, No. 1071267 (Tex. Harris 
Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ............................................................................ 37 
Rescue One Financial LLC v. Doe, No. CACE-14-
024286 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Broward Cnty.) .......................... 20, 21 
RF Holdings v. Tibay, No. 2015-67469 (Tex. Harris 
Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ............................................................................ 37 
Richard v. Jefferson County (1996) 517 U.S. 793 ........................ 64 
Ruddie v. Kirschner, No. 24C15005620 (Md. 
Baltimore City Cir. Ct.) .............................................................. 29 
Salle v. Marine Logistics, No. 50 2015 CA 004469 
XXXX MB (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty.) ..................... 53 
Schwartzapfel v. Guidry, No. 2014-42698 (Tex. Harris 
Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ...................................................................... 37, 57 
SEO Profile Defender Network v. Koshik, No. 2015-
CA-004544 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty.) .................... 45 
 8
Serenbetz v. McDonald, No. BC621992 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Los Angeles Cnty.) .......................................................... 24, 27 
Shah v. Patel, No. 16 CV 10978 (Ohio Franklin Cnty. 
Ct. Com. Pl.) ................................................................................ 47 
Sharos v. www.sexoffenderrecord.com, No. CV-16-
870167 (Ohio Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) ....................... 40, 41 
Shatsman v. Peralto, No. CV-2015-12-5717 (Ohio 
Sumit Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) ........................................................... 38 
Shavolian v. Anonymous John Doe 1, No. 2014-CA-
000845 (Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct. Leon Cnty.) ....................................... 47 
Smith v. Garcia, C.A. No. 16-144 S (D.R.I.) ......... 18, 19, 20, 21, 57 
Smith v. Levin, 24-C-15-004789 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
Baltimore City) ..................................................................... 20, 21 
Somerset v. Galvan, No. 2016-07791 (Tex. Harris 
Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ............................................................................ 37 
Stewart v. Oesterblad, No. 2:13-cv-14841 (E.D. Mich.) ................ 42 
Talson v. Martinez, No. 160603109 (Pa. Phila. Cnty. 
Ct. Com. Pl.) ................................................................................ 39 
Taplin v. Williams, No. CV2015-053547 (Ariz. Super. 
Ct. Maricopa Cnty. ...................................................................... 33 
Tax Help Services v. Smalls, No. 2016-12697 (Tex. 
Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct.) ................................................................ 36 
United States v. Lichterman, No. 1:15-cr-00302-JGK 
(S.D.N.Y.) ............................................................................... 56, 72 
Weaver v. Synthes, Ltd. (U.S.A.) (Ct. App. 1989) 162 
Ariz. 442 ...................................................................................... 59 
Welter v. Does, No. CV2016-004734 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 
Maricopa Cnty.) .......................................................................... 50 
Williams v. Li, No. L15-03752 (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra 
Costa Cnty.) ................................................................................. 24 
Wilson v. Web.com Group, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-02198-
GMN-CWH, 2016 WL 1600830 (D. Nev.) .................................. 42 
 9
Young v. Anonymous John Doe 1, No. 2014-CA-
013423 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty.) .......................... 45 
Statutes 
Cal. Evid. Code § 452 ............................................................... 60, 61 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (c)(1) ......................................................... 59 
Other Authorities 
Aditi Roy & Alexis Shaw, Arizona Cardinals 
Cheerleader Megan Welter Caught on Video 
Allegedly Attacking Boyfriend, ABC News (Aug. 3, 
2013) ............................................................................................ 49 
Affordable Reputation Management, Website ............................. 11 
Angus Loten, Hoping to Fix Bad Reviews? Not So 
Fast, Wall St. J., July 26, 2012, at B5 ....................................... 24 
Cardinals Cheerleader Also Iraq War Vet, Fox Sports 
(July 31, 2013) ............................................................................. 48 
Eugene Volokh & Paul Alan Levy, Dozens of 
Suspicious Court Cases, with Missing Defendants, 
Aim at Getting Web Pages Taken Down or 
Deindexed, The Volokh Conspiracy [Wash. Post] 
(Oct. 10, 2016) ......................................... 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25 
Eugene Volokh, Another of the Suspicious Missing-
Defendant Cases Goes Away, The Volokh 
Conspiracy [Wash. Post] (Oct. 25, 2016) ................................... 22 
Eugene Volokh, Apparently-Fake-Defendant Libel 
Lawsuit Watch: Richart Ruddie & SEO Profile 
Defender Network LLC Paying $71,000 to Settle 
Claim, The Volokh Conspiracy [Wash. Post] (Mar. 
14, 2017) ...................................................................................... 19 
Eugene Volokh, Default Judgment Aimed at 
Deindexing Apparently Accurate Information About 
Person Convicted of Sex Offense, The Volokh 
Conspiracy [Wash. Post] (Feb. 9, 2017) ..................................... 39 
 10 
Eugene Volokh, Libel Takedown Injunctions and 
Fake Notarizations, The Volokh Conspiracy [Wash. 
Post] (Mar. 30, 2017) ................................................................... 28 
Eugene Volokh, N.Y. businessman prosecuted for 
forging court orders to send to Google for 
deindexing, The Volokh Conspiracy (Wash. Post), 
Apr. 19, 2017 ............................................................................... 55 
Eugene Volokh, People Trying to Get Google to 
Deindex Professional News Site Articles, The Volokh 
Conspiracy [Wash. Post] (Dec. 14, 2016) ....................... 43, 44, 45 
Johnny Diaz, Refreshing Your Digital Identity / 
Reputation Managers Scrub Dirt From Companies’ 
Online Profiles, Chi. Trib., Aug. 22, 2012, at C4 ....................... 24 
Letter from David E. Fink, P.A., to Google Inc. (Apr. 
28, 2015) ...................................................................................... 32 
Lumen Database, Website ..................................... 11, 37, 48, 55, 60 
Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining 
Accuracy in Adjudication (1988) 51 L. & Contemp. 
Probs. 243 .................................................................................... 62 
Paul Alan Levy, Richart Ruddie Settles Anti-SLAPP 
Claims, Makes Restitution; but the Guilty 
Companies Remain Unpunished, Consumer Law & 
Policy Blog (Mar. 14, 2017) ........................................................ 19 
Profile Defenders, Profile Defenders Lawsuit Removal 
Service Takes Down Defamatory Webpages............................... 16 
Prominent Grapevine Pastor Linked to Luxury, 
WFAA (Feb. 5, 2010) ................................................................... 43 
Ripoff Report, Website ................................................................... 30 
Robert Anglen, Sex Offender Websites’ Victims 
Awarded $3.4M, USA Today (May 16, 2014) ............................ 41 
Rules 
Cal. Rules of Ct. 8.252(c)(2)(B) ...................................................... 63 
 11 
Treatises 
Wigmore on Evidence (1981) ......................................................... 62 
 
 12 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Eugene Volokh has taught and written about Internet law and 
First Amendment law for over 20 years, and has written over 40 
law review articles on one or both subjects. Since August 2016, he 
has been investigating fraud and other misbehavior related to the 
Internet libel takedown system. 
At the petition for review stage, he submitted an amicus letter 
on behalf of several law professors, including himself; that letter 
focused on traditional doctrinal explanations of why the Court of 
Appeal erred. With the permission of his colleagues and clients 
on that letter, he is now submitting this very different brief, sole-
ly on his own behalf, to explain how the findings of his recent re-
search bear on the question before the court. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Injunctions aimed at removing or deindexing allegedly libelous 
material are a big practice area, and big business. At least hun-
dreds are entered each year throughout the country.1 Companies 
advertise such services, and charge thousands of dollars for 
them.2  
                                         
1 See http://lumendatabase.org, which archives such injunc-
tions; at least about 1000, mostly over the past five years, are 
from the U.S. 
2 See, e.g., Affordable Reputation Management, Guaranteed 
Removal Pricing, http://affordablereputationmanagement.com/
removal-pricing ($12,000 for “de-indexing main link” for items on 
pissedconsumer.com, $5000 for “news sites/blogs,” other prices for 
other sites). 
 13 
Some such injunctions, like the one in this case, are sent to 
sites such as Yelp or the blog host WordPress, asking them to 
remove supposedly defamatory material from their sites. Others 
are sent to search engines such as Google, asking them to remove 
links to such material from their indexes. (The injunctions aimed 
at deindexing by Google appear to be especially common, but pro-
cedurally they are analogous to those aimed at direct removal by 
Yelp and similar sites: Neither Yelp nor Google are parties to the 
original case, but both could equally be seen as “aiders and abet-
tors” under the Court of Appeal’s reasoning.) 
But this process appears to be rife with fraud and with other 
behavior that renders it inaccurate. And this is unsurprising, 
precisely because many such injunctions are aimed at getting ac-
tion from third parties (such as Yelp or Google) that did not ap-
pear in the original proceedings. The adversarial process usually 
offers some assurance of accurate factfinding, because the de-
fendant has the opportunity and incentive to point out the plain-
tiff’s misstatements. But many of the injunctions in such cases 
are gotten through default judgments or stipulations, with no 
meaningful adversarial participation. 
As other briefs in this case point out, basic remedies princi-
ples, the Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment should 
keep such injunctions from being legally binding on companies 
 14 
such as Yelp or Google.3 This brief will aim to show why those le-
gal principles make eminent practical sense. Even if the plaintiffs 
in this case were being completely honest and forthright, many 
plaintiffs in similar cases appear not to be. And if such injunc-
tions are made legally binding, this will only offer more incentive 
for shenanigans. 
In particular, this brief will discuss: 
(1) injunctions gotten in lawsuits brought against apparently 
fake defendants; 
(2) injunctions gotten using fake notarizations; 
(3) injunctions gotten in lawsuits brought against defendants 
who very likely did not author the supposedly defamatory 
material; 
(4) injunctions that seek the deindexing of official and clearly 
nonlibelous government documents—with no notice to the 
documents’ authors—often listed in the middle of a long 
list of website addresses submitted to a judge as part of a 
default judgment; 
(5) injunctions that seek the deindexing of otherwise appar-
ently truthful mainstream articles from websites like 
CNN, based on defamatory comments that the plaintiffs or 
the plaintiffs’ agents may have posted themselves, precise-
ly to have an excuse to deindex the article; 
                                         
3 Yelp Opening Br. on Merits 16–33; Amicus Curiae Br. Of 
Google Inc.; Amici Curiae Br. of First Amendment & Internet 
Law Scholars. 
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(6) injunctions that seek the deindexing of an entire main-
stream media article based on a source’s supposedly re-
canting a quote, with no real determination of whether the 
source was lying earlier, when the article was written, or is 
lying now, prompted by the lawsuit; 
(7) over 40 “injunctions” sent to online service providers that 
appear to be outright forgeries.  
Online service providers, such as Yelp and Google, that get 
these orders are the first line of defense against such behavior, so 
long as they have no legal obligation to comply with such orders 
issued against third parties. The service providers can exercise 
their discretion to conclude that some orders appear untrustwor-
thy. They can demand more documentation from people who 
submit the orders. And if their concerns about their orders are 
not adequately resolved, they can decline to enforce the orders. 
But under Plaintiffs’ view, the service providers would be le-
gally required to deindex or remove any material that has been 
ruled defamatory, even when they have had no chance to partici-
pate in the defamation lawsuit. What if Google sees that the or-
der includes an article in the Davis Enterprise, the Ventura Coun-
ty Star, or Inc. magazine (even though those publications were 
not parties to the case)?4 It would still have to deindex that arti-
cle. What if Google sees that the order includes a Web page on 
the California Department of Real Estate site, or a federal dis-
                                         
4 For examples of injunctions that people were using to try to 
deindex material from those publications, see infra Parts I and 
VI. 
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trict court order hosted on a federal government computer, or a 
court decision listed on findlaw.com?5 Google would have to dein-
dex that, too. 
Google would only be able to protect online speech against 
such deindexing by formally intervening in the suspicious law-
suit, and trying to reopen the judgment. But this would be practi-
cally infeasible. It would at least require spending large sums of 
money to hire local counsel across the country to litigate such 
matters. And such reopening might be procedurally unavailable 
in many places.  
 Yelp, the Court of Appeal held, could be required to abide by 
the injunction in this case because the injunction “was issued fol-
lowing a determination at trial that those statements are defam-
atory.” Hassell v. Bird (2016) 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1360. This 
brief will aim to show that such “determination[s]” are far too 
vulnerable to manipulation to be trustworthy. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Stipulated Injunctions Involving Apparently Fake 
Defendants 
Say that a plaintiff wants a critical article about her removed 
from the Internet. The plaintiff could identify the author, sue the 
author, and get a judgment stating that the article is false. (That 
may well be what plaintiffs in this case did.) 
                                         
5 For examples of injunctions that people were using to try to 
deindex such material from those sites, see infra Part III. 
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But say the plaintiff hires a “reputation management compa-
ny,” especially one that promises “guaranteed removal”6 (i.e., no 
payment if the removal does not happen). And say that company 
is willing to cheat—as is indeed likely if it is to make a “guaran-
tee[]” work as a business model.  
Say the company therefore files a libel lawsuit in the plain-
tiff’s name against a fake defendant, seeking an injunction, and 
accompanies the complaint with a stipulation supposedly signed 
by this defendant (but in reality produced by the company itself). 
The trial judge sees that the parties agree on the injunction, and 
therefore signs the injunction without much further scrutiny. 
And the reputation management company then sends this order 
to Google or Yelp, asking for deindexing or removal of the mate-
rial that the order has ostensibly found to be defamatory. 
That appears to have been attempted in at least 25 cases 
across the country. (See Appendix A for a full list.) The cases ap-
pear to be connected; they are all ostensibly filed pro se, but they 
share certain unusual legal boilerplate. Most of the 25 cases in-
                                         
6 See, e.g., Profile Defenders, Profile Defenders Lawsuit Re-
moval Service Takes Down Defamatory Webpages, https://
pressreleasejet.com/newsreleases/2015/profile-defenders-lawsuit-
removal-service-takes-down-defamatory-webpages/ (“A defama-
tion removal law firm and online reputation management com-
pany combine. Profile Defenders Lawsuit Removal service honors 
a guarantee to take down and defamatory or unwanted webpages 
from search results as long as they meet specific criteria. A guar-
antee is priced in and year to date out of 375 cases only 1 has not 
been successful.”). 
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clude the defendant’s supposed address,7 but there appears to be 
no person with the defendant’s name present at that address.8 
While not all of them have been thoroughly investigated in court, 
in at least two—Smith v. Garcia and Patel v. Chan—there is solid 
record evidence of fraud. 
A. Smith v. Garcia 
The clearest example is Smith v. Garcia, a Rhode Island fed-
eral district court case. Bradley Smith supposedly sued a “Debo-
rah Garcia,” alleging that “Garcia” wrote defamatory comments 
attached to two posts on a consumer advice organization’s blog 
(GetOutOfDebt.org).9 Smith and “Garcia” supposedly signed a 
consent motion, and the court issued a stipulated injunction, 
which included an order that could be submitted to search en-
gines for deindexing.10  
                                         
7 See Appendix A. 
8 Eugene Volokh & Paul Alan Levy, Dozens of Suspicious 
Court Cases, with Missing Defendants, Aim at Getting Web Pages 
Taken Down or Deindexed, The Volokh Conspiracy [Wash. Post] 
(Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/10/10/dozens-of-suspicious-court-cases-with-
missing-defendants-aim-at-getting-web-pages-taken-down-or-
deindexed. 
9 C.A. No. 16-144 S, at 1 (D.R.I. Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.
law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/FedDRISmithvGarcia.pdf. For con-
venience, many of the citations to trial-level court documents in 
this brief include a URL of a copy of the document that amicus 
has placed on the Internet; but all of the documents are also 
available from court records (except for the documents discussed 
in Part VII). 
10 Id. 
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It seems likely that the real goal of the lawsuit was to deindex 
the blog posts, which came from a credible organization (Myvesta, 
which owns GetOutOfDebt.org), and which sharply criticized a 
company owned or co-owned by Smith. The comments by “Garcia” 
were the tail that was used to try to wag the dog. 
Several months later, Myvesta learned of the deindexing, and 
moved to intervene and vacate the injunction. Myvesta had se-
cured the help of lawyer Paul Alan Levy of Public Citizen, a noted 
public interest law firm.11 
When Levy tried to contact “Deborah Garcia” by mail at the 
address listed on the consent motion, the letter was returned as 
undeliverable.12 Public records searches revealed no Deborah 
Garcia associated with that address.13 Levy did reach Bradley 
Smith’s attorney, who stated that Smith had not authorized the 
filing of the case in his name, and had not signed the court pa-
pers.14 
Faced with this information, the court allowed Myvesta to in-
tervene, and vacated the original injunction, citing “evidence that 
the Consent Judgment was procured through fraud on the 
Court.”15 Myvesta also sought to get sanctions for this alleged 
fraud, and sought to get discovery of who was behind it. That 
                                         
11 Smith v. Garcia, C.A. No. 16-144 S, 2017 WL 412722 (D.R.I. 
Jan. 31, 2017). 
12 Id. at *1.  
13 Volokh & Levy, supra note 8. 
14 Smith v. Garcia, 2017 WL 412722, at *1. 
15 Id.  
 20 
person appears to have been Richart Ruddie, owner of the repu-
tation management companies SEO Profile Defender Network 
LLC and RIR1984 LLC.16 
Ruddie ultimately settled the case in exchange for $71,000, 
chiefly consisting of Myvesta’s legal fees (a good measure of how 
much it would have cost Google to challenge the injunction, had it 
had a legal obligation to comply with it).17 Ruddie also agreed to 
ask Florida and Maryland courts to vacate three other court or-
ders that called for the deindexing of Myvesta posts related to 
Smith’s companies, Smith v. Levin, Financial Rescue LLC v. 
Smith, and Rescue One Financial LLC v. Doe.18 In Smith v. Lev-
                                         
16 Eugene Volokh, Apparently-Fake-Defendant Libel Lawsuit 
Watch: Richart Ruddie & SEO Profile Defender Network LLC 
Paying $71,000 to Settle Claim, The Volokh Conspiracy [Wash. 
Post] (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/14/apparently-fake-defendant-
libel-lawsuit-watch-richart-ruddie-seo-profile-defender-network-
llc-paying-71000-to-settle-claim/. 
17 Id. 
18 Settlement Agreement, Smith v. Garcia, C.A. No. 16-144 S, 
at 1 (D.R.I. Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/FedDRISmithvGarcia.pdf; Sanctions Order (Apr. 13, 
2017), id. See also Paul Alan Levy, Richart Ruddie Settles Anti-
SLAPP Claims, Makes Restitution; but the Guilty Companies 
Remain Unpunished, Consumer Law & Policy Blog (Mar. 14, 
2017), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2017/03/richart-ruddie-
settles-anti-slapp-claims-makes-restitution-but-the-guilty-
companies-remain-unpunishe.html; Smith v. Levin, 24-C-15-
004789 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City Oct. 16, 2015), http://
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/MdBaltimoreSmithvLevin.pdf; 
Financial Rescue LLC v. Smith, No. 15-006119-CI (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Pinellas Cnty. Oct 5, 2015), http://
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/FlPinellasFinancialRescuevSmi
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in, court records included Levin’s ostensible address (the common 
practice in Maryland); no-one with that name could be found at 
that address.19 
The court also sent information about this apparent fraud to 
the U.S. Attorney’s office for investigation.20 The investigation 
appears to still be in progress. 
B. Patel v. Chan 
Another case that fits the same pattern as Smith v. Garcia, 
and shares some of the same legalese, is Patel v. Chan. (Indeed, 
amicus learned of Smith v. Garcia by searching in Bloomberg 
Law for dockets that contained similar language to that in Patel 
v. Chan21—Patel was the first such case brought to amicus’s at-
tention.) 
Matthew Chan, a Georgia resident, posted critical Yelp re-
views of Mitul Patel, a Georgia dentist.22 A few months later, 
                                                                                                               
th.pdf; Rescue One Financial LLC v. Doe, No. CACE-14-024286 
(Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Broward Cnty. Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.law.
ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/FlBrowardRescue1FinancialvDoe.pdf. 
19 Volokh, supra note 16. 
20 Smith v. Garcia, C.A. No. 16-144 S, 2017 WL 412722, at *1 
(D.R.I. Jan. 31, 2017). 
21 This was done using Bloomberg Law searches for phrases 
that appeared in the Patel papers, such as “Consent Motion For 
Injunction and Final Judgment” and “Dated, so respectfully.” 
Though such phrases could of course appear in unrelated cases, 
looking through results revealed that many of the orders that use 
one of the phrases also use several others, and thus appear to 
come from the same source (even though all are ostensibly pro se 
lawsuits). 
22 Volokh & Levy, supra note 8. 
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Chan received an email from Yelp explaining that Yelp was con-
sidering taking down his review because a Maryland court con-
cluded it was defamatory.23 But Matthew Chan of Georgia was 
actually never sued.24 Rather, the defendant in the suit was 
“Mathew Chan,” a supposed Baltimore resident.25 
The court issued a stipulated judgment between the Baltimore 
“Mathew Chan” and Mitul Patel, expressly contemplating that 
the order be sent to Yelp so that it could remove the review.26 But 
a private investigator’s search through public records found no 
“Mathew Chan” in Baltimore;27 and in any event, the actual au-
thor of the Yelp review was the Georgia Matthew Chan. After 
Chan moved to intervene and vacate the injunction, Mitul Patel 
moved to voluntarily dismiss the case, claiming that the reputa-
tion management company he hired had filed the lawsuit without 
his knowledge or authorization, and had forged his signature.28 
Following the press coverage of these orders, an injunction in 
a Philadelphia case that fit the similar pattern was as also vacat-
                                         
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Patel v. Chan, No. 24-C16003573 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore 
Cnty. July 22, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
MdBaltimorePatelvChan.pdf. 
27 Volokh & Levy, supra note 8.  
28 Motion to Intervene, Motion to Strike Judgment, and An-
swer to Defendant Mathew Chan’s Motion to Vacate Consent 
Judgment/Order, Patel v. Chan, No. 24-C-16-003573 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
Baltimore Cnty. Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/MdBaltimorePatelvChan.pdf.  
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ed.29 In another similar Philadelphia case, the supposedly stipu-
lated motion for an injunction was denied.30 A similar Florida 
case, which was pending at the time, was voluntarily dropped the 
day that the Washington Post blog post about the cases went 
up.31 
C. California cases 
Several of the cases that fit this pattern have been filed in Cal-
ifornia; here is one example.32 
                                         
29 Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final 
Judgment, Callagy v. Roffman, No. 160603108 (Ct. Com. Pl. Phi-
la. Cnty. July 1, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
PaPhiladelphiaCallagyvRoffman.pdf. The proceedings to vacate 
the order began a month before the press coverage, likely because 
amicus had informed the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas of 
the possible problem. 
30 Murtagh v. Reynolds, No. 160901262 (Pa. Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. 
injunction denied and docket entered Oct. 26, 2016). 
31 Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment, Carter 
v. Quinn, No. 2016-021440-CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade 
Cnty. Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
FlMiamiDadeCartervQuinn.pdf; Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-
021440-CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cnty. Aug. 23, 
2016) (order granting consent motion for injunction and final 
judgment), http://
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/FlMiamiDadeCartervQuinn.pdf
; Eugene Volokh, Another of the Suspicious Missing-Defendant 
Cases Goes Away, The Volokh Conspiracy [Wash. Post] (Oct. 25, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2016/10/25/another-of-the-suspicious-missing-defendant-
cases-goes-away/. 
32 Others are Lyman v. Bernard, No. LC104275 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Los Angeles Cnty. June 6, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/CaLosAngelesLymanvBernard.pdf, which led to an 
injunction that called for the deindexing of an article on the In-
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In 2013, a Davis Enterprise newspaper article reported that a 
Shasta County parent placed false signatures on a petition ask-
ing a school not to change its gifted education program.33 Two 
and a half years later, a “Robert Castle” posted a comment un-
derneath the article, accusing the parent of taking bribes.34 
Within a few months, a person apparently bearing the par-
ent’s name purportedly sued “Robert Castle” in Shasta County 
and sought an injunction to compel him to remove the review.35 
The plaintiff also supposedly filed a consent motion, with a signa-
ture purportedly from Castle.36  
Instead of simply granting the injunction, the court set a hear-
ing on its own motion, noting that there was no proof of service of 
                                                                                                               
vestment News site; Serenbetz v. McDonald, No. BC621992 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Los Angeles Cnty. June 6, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/CaLosAngelesSerenbetzvMcDonald.pdf, which 
was aimed at deindexing a copy of a federal court decision posted 
on http://leagle.com; and Williams v. Li, No. L15-03752 (Cal. Su-
per. Ct. Contra Costa Cnty. Dec. 18, 2015), http:// www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/CaContraCostaWilliamsvLi.pdf, which led to 
an injunction that called for the deindexing of posts critical of 
Profile Defenders, a company owned by Richart Ruddie, who 
seems to be behind these cases.  
33 Volokh & Levy, supra note 8. 
34 Id. 
35 Complaint, Glatter v. Castle, No. 184324 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Shasta Cnty. Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/CaShastaGlattervCastle.pdf. 
36 Order Setting Hearing Date on Consent Motion, Glatter v. 
Castle, No. 184324 (Cal. Super. Ct. Shasta Cnty. Mar. 8, 2016), 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/CaShastaGlattervCastle.
pdf. 
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the complaint, consent motion, or proposed order.37 The docket 
does not indicate that a hearing was ever held, which is con-
sistent with the suspicion that “Castle” does not exist.38 A public 
records search revealed no “Robert Castle” in Shasta County, 
even though court filings included a Shasta County address.39 
Yet about two months later, a similar complaint with the same 
supposed plaintiff and defendant was filed in Los Angeles Coun-
ty.40 This time, the stipulated injunction was granted without a 
hearing.41 (Note that it is possible that the ostensible plaintiff 
might not have authorized or expected anything untoward: A 
person who hires a reputable-seeming “reputation management 
company” might well assume that its work will not involve 
fraudulent court filings,42 and indeed some ostensible plaintiffs in 
                                         
37 Id. 
38 Volokh & Levy, supra note 8. 
39 Id. 
40 Complaint, Glatter v. Castle, No. SC125890 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Los Angeles Cnty. May 23, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/CaLosAngelesGlattervCastle.pdf.  
41 Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction & Final 
Judgment, Glatter v. Castle, No. SC125890 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los 
Angeles Cnty. June 24, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/CaLosAngelesGlattervCastle.pdf. 
42 Profile Defenders had been mentioned in reputable publica-
tions, e.g., Johnny Diaz, Refreshing Your Digital Identity /Repu-
tation Managers Scrub Dirt From Companies’ Online Profiles, 
Chi. Trib., Aug. 22, 2012, at C4; Angus Loten, Hoping to Fix Bad 
Reviews? Not So Fast, Wall St. J., July 26, 2012, at B5. 
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the cases discussed in this Part have claimed that they did not 
authorize the filing of the lawsuits.43) 
For some reason, it appears that this particular injunction was 
never actually submitted to Google with a request to deindex the 
Davis Enterprise article, even though the injunction specifically 
contemplated such a submission.44 And even if had been submit-
ted, Google may well have noticed that there was something fishy 
about an attempt to deindex an article in a credible news source. 
But under Hassell’s theory, Google could have been legally ob-
ligated to hide the Davis Enterprise article from the world, so 
long as the plaintiff had asked the court to treat Google as an 
aider and abettor of the supposed author (much as the Court of 
Appeal viewed Yelp as an aider and abettor). Indeed, similar law-
suits were brought in attempts to deindex articles in the Charles-
ton Post & Courier45 and Investment News,46 as well as a court 
                                         
43 Volokh & Levy, supra note 8. 
44 “If the Defendant cannot remove the Defamation from the 
Internet, the Plaintiff shall submit this Order to Google, Yahoo, 
Bing, or any other Internet search engine so that the link can be 
removed from their search results pursuant to their existing poli-
cies concerning de-indexing of defamatory material.” Order 
Granting Consent Motion for Injunction & Final Judgment, Glat-
ter v. Castle, No. SC125890, at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles 
Cnty. June 24, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
CaLosAngelesGlattervCastle.pdf.  
45 Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-021440-CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 
Miami-Dade Cnty. Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/FlMiamiDadeCartervQuinn.pdf. 
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decision included in full on a case law distribution site, 
leagle.com.47 
* * * 
It is a truism that lack of opportunity for an adversary presen-
tation makes factfinding unreliable. These cases, and those be-
low, show the truth of that truism.  
If Yelp or Google had actually been a party to the proceedings, 
it may well have noticed that the ostensible defendants were like-
ly fake. But in the cases described above, there was apparently no 
real party other than the entity that wanted the material taken 
down or deindexed. As a result, courts were apparently duped in-
to entering the orders. And if Google or Yelp were held to be le-
gally bound by such orders, the incentive to engage in such fraud 
would only increase. 
II. Stipulated Injunctions Involving Fake Notarizations 
One means of verifying that a defendant actually exists is to 
get the defendant’s signature notarized. But who will verify the 
verifiers? What if the notarization is itself forged? 
Consider Chinnock v. Ivanski, a case in which the complaint 
identified the defendant as “an individual who resides in Tur-
                                                                                                               
46 Lyman v. Bernard, No. LC104275 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Ange-
les Cnty. June 6, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
CaLosAngelesLymanvBernard.pdf. 
47 Serenbetz v. McDonald, No. BC621992 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los 
Angeles Cnty. June 6, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/CaLosAngelesSerenbetzvMcDonald.pdf. 
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key.”48 However, on the Amended Order for Permanent Injunc-
tion, the defendant’s signature was notarized by a Samantha 
Pierce of Colorado, and here is a copy of her notary stamp:49  
  
20121234567 appears suspicious, and in this instance appearanc-
es do not deceive: There is no Samantha Pierce listed on the Colo-
rado notary site, with that notary ID or any other.50 Likewise, on 
the earlier, pre-amendment Stipulated Order for Permanent In-
junction, the notary for Ivanski’s signature is said to be Amanda 
Sparks of Fulton County, Georgia.51 Again, there is no Amanda 
Sparks of Fulton County on the Georgia notary website.52 
                                         
48 Complaint & Application for Injunctive Relief, Chinnock v. 
Ivanski, No. CV2016-094256 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty. 
Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
AzMaricopaChinnockvIvanski.pdf. 
49 Amended Order for Permanent Injunction, Chinnock v. 
Ivanski, No. CV2016-094256 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty. 
Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
AzMaricopaChinnockvIvanski.pdf. 
50 Verify a Notary, Colorado Secretary of State, 
https://www.sos.state.co.us/notary/pages/public/verifyNotary.xht
ml (Type Pierce as last name and Samantha as first name). 
51 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Chinnock v. 
Ivanski, No. CV2016-094256 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty. 
Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
AzMaricopaChinnockvIvanski.pdf. 
52 Notary Index Search, Georgia Superior Court Clerks’ Coop-
erative Authority, https://www.sos.state.co.us/notary/pages/
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Similarly, in Lynd v. Hood, the notary listed for the defend-
ant’s signature is Jose Garcia from Harris County, Texas and his 
license is said to expire on March 2, 2016.53 However, there is no 
Jose Garcia listed on the Texas notary website with the same li-
cense expiration date.54 (The injunction in Lynd also called for 
the deindexing of a professional media item, a San Antonio Ex-
press-News article describing plaintiff’s split from his family 
business.55) Chinnock v. Ivanski and Lynd v. Hood were both filed 
by lawyers from one small Phoenix firm. That firm also litigated 
Welter v. Does, discussed in Part VI.B below; and one of the law-
yers in that firm was also the beneficiary of one of the Richart-
Ruddie-linked orders discussed in Part I,56 though there is no ev-
idence that Ruddie was involved with the fake-notarization cases. 
                                                                                                               
public/verifyNotary.xhtml (Type Sparks, Amanda as name and 
select Fulton as county).  
53 No. CV2015-009398 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty.), http: 
//www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/AzMaricopaLyndvHood.pdf. 
54 Notary Search, Texas Secretary of State, https://direct.sos.
state.tx.us/notaries/NotarySearch.asp (Type Jose for first name, 
Garcia for last name, and Harris for County). 
55 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Lynd v. Hood, 
No. CV2015-009398, at 2 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty. Jan. 
27, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/AzMaricopa
LyndvHood.pdf. See also Eugene Volokh, Libel Takedown Injunc-
tions and Fake Notarizations, The Volokh Conspiracy [Wash. 
Post] (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/30/libel-takedown-injunctions-and-
fake-notarizations/. 
56 Ruddie v. Kirschner, No. 24C15005620 (Md. Baltimore City 
Cir. Ct. injunction issued Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/MdBaltimoreRuddievKirschner.pdf. 
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III. Injunctions Against a Defendant Who Likely Is Not 
the Real Author: The Government Document Cases 
Say that a judgment involves a real defendant, who stipulates 
to the injunction. How can we know that this stipulating defend-
ant is the real author of the allegedly defamatory material? Often 
we cannot know for sure, especially unless the real author some-
how learns of the injunction and comes forward. 
But sometimes the judgment involves a supposed finding—in 
an order that was likely submitted by the plaintiff’s lawyer for 
the court’s signature—that the defendant is the author of some-
thing that turns out to be a government document, such as a ju-
dicial or administrative order. The defendant could not have writ-
ten the document, and the document is in any event absolutely 
privileged against defamation liability. And the plaintiff is thus 
seeking to hide a government document from public view, based 
on what appears to be an inaccurate statement. 
A. Consider Fertel v. Saul. A Maryland lawyer represented 
Maryland author Morton Fertel, the author of DVDs that offered 
marriage counseling. Jan Davidson, apparently a disappointed 
customer who lived in California, posted criticisms of Fertel’s 
company. The lawyer sued Davidson in Maryland federal district 
court, seeking to get an order that could be used to deindex three 
posts, but the court dismissed the claim because of lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction over Davidson.57 
                                         
57 Fertel v. Davidson, Civ. No. CCB-13-2922, 2013 WL 6842890 
(D. Md. Dec. 18, 2013).  
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The lawyer then filed a lawsuit in Maryland state court 
against one Seemah Saul, who had allegedly posted various 
comments critical of Fertel.58 The lawsuit sought to use the com-
ments as a basis for deindexing over twenty posts, including all 
three that were the targets of the unsuccessful Fertel v. Davidson 
case.59 Saul’s comments were actually much less negative than 
the posts: The comments generally said things like “Mort Fertel 
plagiarized Dr. Harley’s book. Mort has the best program out 
there . . . it works, but it’s plagiarized,”60 while the posts accused 
Fertel of refusing to honor money-back guarantees and the like.61 
Consumers of marriage counseling advice would likely be much 
more put off by claims that a product does not work, or cannot be 
returned if it does not work, than by claims about plagiarism (es-
pecially when the claims also state that the program is “the best 
program out there”). 
Saul did not appear at trial and did not actively contest the 
case; but the lawyer’s memorandum in support of the judgment 
                                         
58 Fertel v. Saul, No. 24-C-14-003049 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore 
Cnty. Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
MdBaltimoreFertelvSaul.pdf. 
59 Id. 
60 Ripoff Report #769548, http://www.ripoffreport.com/reports/
software-mort-fertel-mort-fertel-marriage-max-marr-769548 (el-
lipsis in original, capitalization added for clarity). See also Order, 
Fertel v. Saul, No. 24-C-14-003049, at 2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore 
Cnty. Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
MdBaltimoreFertelvSaul.pdf (listing the URL for Ripoff Report 
#769548). 
61 Ripoff Report #769548, http://www.ripoffreport.com/reports/
software-mort-fertel-mort-fertel-marriage-max-marr-769548. 
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stated that the lawyer had “determined” that defendant Saul was 
in fact the person responsible for various defamatory state-
ments.62 On the strength of these allegations, the court issued a 
default judgment against the defendant, which necessarily as-
sumes that the defendant is actually responsible for the state-
ments in question, and that the statements in question are, in 
fact, defamatory.63 
Yet here are some of the sites that the injunction included, as 
supposedly being defamatory and having been written by Saul: 
 
Item 19 on the list of 29 supposedly defamatory web pages was 
the district court order in Fertel v. Davidson, the earlier case that 
plaintiff and plaintiff’s lawyer had lost. The plaintiff’s lawyer 
                                         
62 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Fertel v. Saul, No. 24-C-14-003049 (Md. Cir. 
Ct. Baltimore Cnty. Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/MdBaltimoreFertelvSaul.pdf.  
63 Order, Fertel v. Saul, No. 24-C-14-003049, at 2 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
Baltimore Cnty. Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/MdBaltimoreFertelvSaul.pdf. 
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then sent an order to Google requesting that it deindex the URLs 
listed in the order.64  
The order was not written by defendant Saul. Even if it con-
tained factual errors, it could not have been libelous because it is 
privileged. It is an official federal government document. Yet 
plaintiff’s lawyer was trying to get it hidden from the public, on 
the strength of a default judgment against Saul. 
B. Likewise, in Taplin v. Williams, a default judgment called 
for deindexing a California Department of Real Estate page im-
posing discipline on plaintiff Steve Taplin (a real estate agent), as 
well deindexing as a judicial opinion from the Georgia Court of 
Appeals.65 The two were buried in a list of 14 URLs, as items 12 
and 13; here is the tail end of that list: 
 
                                         
64 Letter from David E. Fink, P.A., to Google Inc. (Apr. 28, 
2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/MdBaltimoreFertel
vSaul.pdf. 
65 Default Judgment, No. CV2015-053547 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 
Maricopa Cnty. Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/AzMaricopaTaplinvWilliams.pdf. The judgment stated 
that “[p]laintiff may request removal or deindexing of all content 
from Google and other search engines.” Id. 
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C. Similarly, in Karosa v. Killian, the default judgment calls 
for deindexing an administrative order that mentioned a case 
brought against plaintiff; a judicial opinion in a case brought by 
plaintiff; and an order imposing a fine on plaintiff in a discipli-
nary proceeding—all buried in a long list of URLs, as items 117, 
121, and 123:66 
 
 
And these are just some sample cases. There are others: Ram-
sthel v. Penny sought to deindex, among other things, a public no-
tice published in a local legal newspaper announcing the lawsuit 
itself.67 Likewise, in Intravas, Inc. v. Metcalf, the same law firm 
as in Ramsthel sought to deindex—on the grounds that they were 
                                         
66 Order Granting Default Judgment, No. A-12-670259-C at 9–
10 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Clark Cnty. Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.law.
ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/NvClarkKarosavKillian.pdf. 
67 Default Judgment, Ramsthel v. Penny, No. CV2014-093104 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty. Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.
law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/AzMaricopaRamsthelvPenny.pdf. 
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supposedly defamatory—posted copies of documents in the same 
case, including of a subpoena that it had itself submitted.68 
IV. Injunctions Against a Defendant Who May Not Be 
the Real Author: The Out-of-State California Nota-
rization Cases 
There are also several sets of stipulated judgments from Texas 
and from Ohio (in over 15 cases put together) that share an unu-
sual property. All of the cases say that the defendant resides (or 
at least “may reside”) in Texas or in Ohio; presumably that is the 
justification for the cases being filed in those states. But in every 
one of these cases, the defendant’s signature was notarized in 
California (in all but one case, in the Bay Area-Sacramento corri-
dor). 
Now it is of course possible that, in one case, a defendant may 
get a signature notarized while traveling. But seven such cases 
from one Houston lawyer, three from another Houston lawyer, 
and five from an Ohio lawyer? We hear about eco-tourism, medi-
cal tourism, and even sex tourism—but we never hear about no-
tarization tourism, even to lovely Northern California. The likeli-
er inference is that there is something odd afoot. One possibility, 
though amicus acknowledges that it is speculative, is that some 
“reputation management company” hired by plaintiffs has lined 
up local defendants who incorrectly claim to have written defam-
                                         
68 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Intravas, Inc. v. 
Metcalf, No. CV2012-013872 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty. 
Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/AzMaricopa
IntravasvMetcalf.pdf. 
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atory material, and then stipulate to the issuance of an injunc-
tion that could then be sent to Google with a deindexing request. 
In one set of these cases, one Texas lawyer represented plain-
tiffs in seven 2016 cases where the court and the defendant’s ad-
dress were in Texas, but the defendant’s signature on the Waiver 
of Service, Affidavit, or Answer was notarized in Northern Cali-
fornia.69 (According to Houston court records, these are the only 
defamation cases that this lawyer has ever filed in Houston dis-
trict courts.70) Another Texas lawyer has represented plaintiffs in 
                                         
69 BCI Property Management v. Ramos, No. 2016-29570 (Tex. 
Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed May 5, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/TxHarrisBCIvRamos.pdf; Eccentric Holdings 
v. Largo, No. 2016-61892 (Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Sept. 
22, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/TxHarris
EccentricvLargo.pdf; Fox & Assocs. v. Wallace, No. 2016-06674 
(Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.law.
ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/TxHarrisFoxAssocsvWallace.pdf; Grisak 
Properties v. Baroro, No. 2016-46539 (Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. 
filed July 14, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
TxHarrisGrisakvBaroro.pdf; Holdren v. Ortega, No. 2016-49421 
(Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed July 26, 2016), http://www.law.
ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/TxHarrisHoldrenvOrtega.pdf; Kosage v. 
Nelson, No. 2016-39989 (Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed June 9, 
2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/TxHarrisKosagev
Nelson.pdf; Tax Help Services v. Smalls, No. 2016-12697 (Tex. 
Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.
law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/TxHarrisTaxHelpServicesvSmalls.pd
f. The defendants’ signatures in these cases were notarized in Al-
ameda, Contra Costa, Sacramento, or Solano counties. 
70 This information is available by searching Harris County 
court records at http://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/Edocs/Public/
search.aspx, and searching for the lawyer’s bar number, with 
case type “defamation.” 
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three 2016 cases that fit the same pattern.71 Three other Texas 
lawyers have done the same in one or two cases each.72  
One Ohio lawyer likewise represented plaintiffs in five 2015–
16 Ohio cases, with the complaints stating that the defendant is 
believed to reside in Ohio, or at least “may reside in” Ohio.73 
                                         
71 Amovious Networks v. Edwards, No. 2016-45988 (Tex. Har-
ris Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed July 28, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/TxHarrisAmoviousNetworksvEdwards.pdf; Med 
Link Networking Solutions v. Jones, No. 2016-24479 (Tex. Harris 
Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/TxHarrisMedLinkvJones.pdf; Somerset v. Galvan, 
No. 2016-07791 (Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 5, 2016), 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/TxHarrisSomersetvGalva
n.pdf. The defendants’ signatures were likewise notarized in Al-
ameda, Contra Costa, or Solano counties. 
72 RF Holdings v. Tibay, No. 2015-67469 (Tex. Harris Cnty. 
Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/TxHarrisRFHoldingsvTibay.pdf; RBJ Enters. v. Alexan-
der, No. 1071267 (Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/TxHarrisRBJEnterprises
vAlexander.pdf; MB Ventures v. Medina, No. DC-16-05087 (Tex. 
Dallas Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.law.
ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/TxDallasMBVenturesvMedina.pdf; 
Schwartzapfel v. Guidry, No. 2014-42698 (Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. 
Ct. filed July 25, 2014), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
TxHarrisSchwartzapfelvGuidry.pdf. The defendants’ signatures 
were notarized in Contra Costa, Solano, and Los Angeles coun-
ties; the Los Angeles notarization was the only one in any of 
these cases not from the Bay Area-Sacramento corridor. 
73 See ASIAUSA v. Williamson, No. CV-15-841465 (Ohio 
Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/OhCuyahogaASIAUSAvWilliamson.pdf; Dr-
Max Limited v. Kahapeachow, No. CV-16-858256 (Ohio Cuyahoga 
Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/OhCuyahogaDr-MaxLimitedvKahapeachow.pdf; 
Gossels Casting v. Dinsdale, No. CV-2015-05-2812 (Ohio Summit 
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There are also similar cases in Florida74 and in Maryland;75 the 
Florida case was filed by a lawyer at the same firm where the 
Ohio lawyer was practicing at the time, and the Maryland case 
was apparently submitted to Google by the Ohio lawyer.76 
It is not clear who was responsible for procuring the notariza-
tions. It is possible that neither the lawyers nor the plaintiffs 
were involved in that process, but just accepted documents from a 
reputation management company, expecting that the defendants 
had been properly identified and were indeed the authors of the 
allegedly defamatory posts. But in any event, there is reason to 
doubt that the posts litigated in these cases were actually all 
written by people in Northern California. 
                                                                                                               
Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. June 18, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/OhSummitGosselsCastingvDinsdale.pdf; Premiere 
Casting Events v. Valencia, No. 16CV005975 (Ohio Franklin 
Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/OhFranklinPremiereCastingEventsvValencia.pdf; 
Shatsman v. Peralto, No. CV-2015-12-5717 (Ohio Sumit Cnty. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
OhSummitShatsmanvPeralto.pdf. The defendants’ signatures 
were notarized in Contra Costa, Santa Clara, and Solano coun-
ties. 
74 Blue Haven Nat’l Mgm’t v. Galvan, No. 2016CA2880 (Fla. 
4th Cir. Ct. Duval Cnty. June 16, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/FlDuvalBlueHavenvGalvan.pdf. The defendant’s 
signature was notarized in Solano county. 
75 Groza v. Handley, No. C-16-71540 (Md. Carroll Cnty. Cir. 
Ct. Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
MdCarrollGrozavHandley.pdf. The defendant’s signature was no-
tarized in San Francisco.  
76 https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/12982683. 
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V. Default Judgments Obtained Without Genuine At-
tempts at Locating Defendants  
The examples given so far involved alleged stipulated judg-
ments; these judgments are convenient in part because they can 
be obtained quickly. In two cases, a permanent injunction was 
entered four days after a complaint was filed together with a 
stipulation.77  
Yet plaintiffs can also get default judgments, whether against 
identified defendants or pseudonymous ones. These judgments 
can often be legitimate, and indeed can often be the best that an 
honest plaintiff can get.  
But they can also be obtained without any real attempt to 
serve or even identify the true defendant. The point of these de-
fault judgments, after all, is just to get an order that can be sent 
to Google, Yelp, or some other organization. It is much more con-
venient if the real author of the material is never identified, and 
never has an opportunity to contest the case. In a traditional libel 
case, the plaintiff wants to find the defendant, so that the de-
fendant can be forced to pay damages. In a libel takedown case, 
the plaintiff who is seeking an order that would be sent to a third 
party would rather that the real author stay far away. 
                                         
77 See Talson v. Martinez, No. 160603109 (Pa. Phila. Cnty. Ct. 
Com. Pl. July 1, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
PaPhiladelphiaTalsonvMartinez.pdf; Callagy v. Roffman, No. 
160603108 (Pa. Phila. Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. July 1, 2016), http://
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/PaPhiladelphiaCallagyv
Roffman.pdf. 
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It is impossible to tell just how often plaintiffs fail to take easy 
steps to find the alleged defamer. But one case well illustrates 
the peril. 
In 1999, Laurence Sharos pleaded guilty to “criminal sexual 
abuse” in Illinois.78 Based on court records, his crime was likely 
unwanted sexually motivated fondling.79 The website SexOf-
fenderRecord.com gathered this information from public records 
and published it.80 
Years later, Sharos sued, and got a default judgment conclud-
ing that the website’s pages were “false and defamatory” because 
they labeled him a “sex offender.”81 Sharos was indeed a sex of-
fender, but Sharos argued that the “sex offender” label—coupled 
with a reference on SexOffenderRecord.com pages to each listed 
person’s “registration status”—falsely conveyed that he is a regis-
tered sex offender, when in fact he has only been convicted of a 
                                         
78 Eugene Volokh, Default Judgment Aimed at Deindexing Ap-
parently Accurate Information About Person Convicted of Sex Of-
fense, The Volokh Conspiracy [Wash. Post] (Feb. 9, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/02/09/
default-judgment-aimed-at-deindexing-apparently-accurate-
information-about-person-convicted-of-sex-offense/.  
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default 
Judgment, Sharos v. www.sexoffenderrecord.com, No. CV-16-
870167 (Ohio Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 5, 2017), 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/OhCuyahogaSharosvwww
.sexoffenderrecord.com.pdf. 
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sex offense and is not a registered sex offender.82 And the court 
agreed.83 
This conclusion might well have been wrong as a matter of 
law, and perhaps an adversary presentation (followed, if neces-
sary, by an appeal) would have shown it to be wrong. But there 
was no adversarial proceeding, only a default judgment. Sharos’ 
lawyers claimed that SexOffenderRecord.com “provide[d] no 
means to contact it,”84 and that they could not find the site’s own-
ers; according to one of Sharos’s lawyers (who was cocounsel with 
the Ohio lawyer described in Part IV, who filed several Ohio law-
suits with Northern California notarizations): 
2. Prior to filing the Complaint in this matter, I con-
ducted a search to determine the address for Defend-
ant www.sexoffenderrecord.com, also known as 
www.sorarchive.com. I reviewed Defendant’s website 
but it does not contain any address or other identify-
ing information such as a telephone number or con-
tact information. Additionally, the “contact” page on 
the website is blank, has no form or any information 
to send any communication to the site. Therefore, the 
website provides no means to contact it. 
3. I also conducted multiple searches on the Internet 
to try and determine the owner of the website and/or 
its location and also looked at various secretary of 
state websites. Through these efforts, I was unable to 
                                         
82 Id.  
83 Order for Default Judgment, id. 
84 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default 
Judgment, Sharos v. www.sexoffenderrecord.com, No. CV-16-
870167 (Ohio Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 5, 2017), http://
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/OhCuyahogaSharosvwww.sexof
fenderrecord.com.pdf. 
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identify the address of Defendant or to locate any 
other identifying information about the Defendant. 
Yet at SexOffenderRecord.com, the very top line of the site 
under the banner has a tag saying “Record Removal Inquiries.” 
That page has a form through which lawyers can submit record 
removal requests to the site.85 
And “searches on the Internet” can actually easily identify the 
SexOffenderRecord.com operators within minutes. A Google 
Scholar search for “sexoffenderrecord” finds Wilson v. Web.com 
Group, Inc.,86 which also involves SexOffenderRecord.com and 
Web Express and mentions Charles Rodrick, who appears to be 
one of the operators of the site. That search also finds Stewart v. 
Oesterblad,87 which involves the same site and mentions Charles 
Roderick (with a slightly different spelling than in Wilson) and 
Brent Oesterblad, who appears to be another of the operators. 
The information in the records of those cases could likely be used 
to track down the site operators further. 
A Google search for “sexoffenderrecord” also finds a USA To-
day article about a 2014 verdict against the operators of SexOf-
fenderRecord.com and SORArchives.com, which mentions 
Charles Rodrick.88 A Google News search finds the same site. 
                                         
85 Volokh, supra note 78. 
86 No. 2:15-cv-02198-GMN-CWH, 2016 WL 1600830 (D. Nev. 
Apr. 20, 2016). 
87 No. 2:13-cv-14841 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2014). 
88 Robert Anglen, Sex Offender Websites’ Victims Awarded 
$3.4M, USA Today (May 16, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/
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And these are just free searches—Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg 
Law searches will find still more cases. 
So there was no real justification in this case for proceeding 
via service by publication and a default judgment; and the same 
may well be true of many other default judgments used to get 
takedown orders. We cannot know for sure in most cases, precise-
ly because there was no adversarial inquiry into the question. 
But we do know that the incentives (for the unscrupulous) point 
towards avoiding finding the true defendant. 
VI. Default or Stipulated Judgments Aimed at Deindex-
ing Professional Media Articles 
Plaintiffs also seem to be attempting to deindex professional 
media articles, from organizations such as CNN, USA Today, the 
New York Daily News, local TV stations, and more. Of course, if 
plaintiffs sued the media organizations directly, the organiza-
tions would likely fight back—and likely successfully so. But 
some plaintiffs’ lawyers are cleverer than that. 
A. Wag the Dog: Lawsuits Based on Allegedly Defamatory 
Comments 
Here is trick number one: plaintiffs find a critical comment 
that has been posted under the article by some anonymous user. 
They then sue the commenter for libel, and get a default or stipu-
lated judgment that finds that the comment is defamatory (not 
that the article is defamatory). It appears that they often do not 
                                                                                                               
story/news/nation/2014/05/16/sex-offender-websites-victims-
awarded-34m-/9195315. 
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e-mail the media outlet to ask it to remove the comment89—
because removing the comment seems not to be their goal.  
Instead, they submit the order directly to Google, asking it to 
deindex the entire page at which the comment is posted. And that 
page includes the article itself: Because Google can only deindex 
entire pages, and cannot remove comments, the only way it can 
deindex the comment is by also deindexing the article to which it 
is attached. This seems to be a variant of the wag-the-dog strate-
gy used in the fake-defendant scheme, see Part I, but mostly us-
ing default judgments rather than stipulations by apparently 
fake defendants. 
Consider, for instance, Young v. Anonymous John Doe. WFAA, 
a Dallas news station, wrote an article about Edwin Young, a fif-
ty-five year old Texas minister, author, and founder of the Fel-
lowship Church.90 The article alleged that Young was living a life 
of luxury and that attendance at church was declining.91 Four 
years later, “Noemi Hernandez” posted an absurdly false com-
                                         
89 Eugene Volokh, People Trying to Get Google to Deindex Pro-
fessional News Site Articles, The Volokh Conspiracy [Wash. Post] 
(Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/12/14/people-trying-to-get-google-to-deindex-
professional-news-site-articles/. 
90 Id.; Prominent Grapevine Pastor Linked to Luxury, WFAA 
(Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/investigates/
prominent-grapevine-pastor-linked-to-luxury/338287756. 
91 Id. 
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ment on the page, claiming Young was homeless and abandoned 
his biological son sixty-five years ago.92  
Just three weeks after the comment was posted, Young’s law-
yer filed a lawsuit in Florida state court against “Anonymous 
John Doe 1.”93 (This lawyer was also a lawyer in a case brought 
by Profile Defenders to deindex posts critical of their business,94 
though this was not one of the cases discussed in Part I.) The Af-
fidavit of Diligent Search filed in that case did not state that the 
lawyer had tried to subpoena the commenter’s Internet Protocol 
address to track the commenter down,95 and WFAA stated that it 
had not received any such subpoena.96 Rather, the lawyer used 
service by publication, publishing a notice in a local Florida 
newspaper announcing the suit—a practically ineffective form of 
notice, even if it is sometimes legally available.97 Young received 
                                         
92 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, exh. A, Young v. 
Anonymous John Doe 1, No. 2014-CA-013423 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 
Palm Beach Cnty. June 16, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/FlPalmBeachYoungvAnonymousJohnDoe.pdf. 
93 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, id. 
94 SEO Profile Defender Network v. Koshik, No. 2015-CA-
004544 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty. July 15, 2015), 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/FlPalmBeachSEOProfile
DefenderNetworkvKoshik.pdf. 
95 Affidavit of Diligent Search, Young v. Anonymous John Doe 
1, No. 2014-CA-013423 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty. June 
16, 2015). 
96 Volokh, supra note 87. 
97 Order Granting Final Default Judgment, Young v. Anony-
mous John Doe 1, No. 2014-CA-013423 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Palm 
Beach Cnty. June 16, 2015). 
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a default judgment, authorizing him to submit the order to 
search engines.98 
It thus seems that this default judgment against a commenter 
was used as a means of trying to hide a likely accurate article 
about Young, published by a Texas TV station. But the timing 
and the absurdly false nature of the comment also raises the pos-
sibility that someone on the plaintiff’s side—Young, a reputation 
management company hired by Young, Young’s lawyer, or some-
one else—posted the comment precisely as an excuse to deindex 
the whole article. 
It is impossible to tell from these facts whether this actually 
happened in this case; but the history of the case shows that such 
a strategy of deliberately posting a comment precisely to have an 
excuse to get a deindexing order could be effective. If this strate-
gy was not used in this case, it may well have been used in oth-
ers. And if Yelp, Google, and similar companies are legally obli-
gated to enforce such takedown orders, then the incentive to 
fraudulently generate such orders would become especially great. 
Young is just a sample; we see the same pattern in: 
 Shavolian v. Anonymous John Doe 1, aimed at deindexing a 
New York Daily News article about David Shavolian, a New 
York real estate businessman who was sued for workplace 
harassment.99  
                                         
98 Id. 
99 Volokh, supra note 87; Order Granting Final Default Judg-
ment, Shavolian v. Anonymous John Doe 1, No. 2014-CA-000845 
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 M & M Inc. v. Brooks, filed by the same lawyer as Young v. 
Anonymous John Doe 1, and aimed partly at deindexing ar-
ticles in the online technology publications Gizmodo, 
TechDissected, and DigitalTrends criticizing an allegedly 
junk-science laundry technology sold by M & M Inc.100 
 Bansal v. Kumar, aimed at deindexing a Phoenix New 
Times article that described the disbarment of a successful 
Arizona lawyer.101 
 Shah v. Patel, aimed at deindexing a Columbus Dispatch 
article critical of a local doctor.102 
B. Lying Then or Lying Now?: Attempts to Deindex Pro-
fessional Media Articles Based on a Source’s Supposed-
ly Recanting an Allegation 
Now, trick two. Search engines like Google cannot remove 
quotes from legitimate news articles. If given a takedown order, 
they can only deindex the entire article. As a result, in several 
                                                                                                               
(Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct. Leon Cnty. July 8, 2014), http://www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/FlLeonShavolianvAnonymousJohnDoe1.pdf. 
100 M&M Inc. v. Brooks, No. 2016-CA-001330 (Fla. 15th Cir. 
Ct. Palm Beach Cnty. Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/FlPalmBeachMMIncvBrooks.pdf. 
101 Bansal v. Kumar, No. V425852 (Md. Montgomery Cnty. 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
MdMontgomeryBansalvKumar.pdf; https://www.lumendatabase.
org/notices/13781781. 
102 Shah v. Patel, No. 16 CV 10978 (Ohio Franklin Cnty. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
OhFranklinShahvPatel.pdf; https://www.lumendatabase.org/
notices/13833849. 
 48 
cases plaintiffs who dislike professional media articles that criti-
cize them have: 
(a) apparently gotten stipulations from the defendants recant-
ing their allegations, 
(b) gotten court orders against the defendants based on those 
stipulations, and then 
(c) submitted the orders to Google, asking Google to deindex 
the critical article. 
Now, if a media organization gets such a recantation from one 
of the sources they quote, the editors would reasonably ask: Was 
the source lying then, or is he lying now? If the editors are per-
suaded that the recantation is accurate, they might well publish 
a correction, or revise or even take down the original article. But 
if they think that the original report was accurate, and the recan-
tation was coerced using a lawsuit, they might stand by their sto-
ry. 
When a plaintiff sues the source, though, gets a stipulation, 
and submits the order to Google with a deindexing request, the 
plaintiff is trying to short-circuit the news organization’s review 
of the matter. Instead, the plaintiff wants to just get the original 
story hidden, with no independent evaluation of whether the sto-
ry was and continues to be correct. Today, it appears that Google 
is generally reluctant to deindex professional media articles, 
which can frustrate such a plaintiff stratagem. But if Google were 
required to comply with court orders to which it was not a party, 
then the stories would have to be deindexed. 
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Consider, for example, Ball v. Saurman, a case in Ventura 
County Superior Court. A Ventura County Star article had quoted 
Sandee Saurman as sharply criticizing Dr. Kiely Ball’s hearing 
aid company.103 Ball sued Saurman, who eventually agreed to a 
stipulation in which she stated that her original allegations were 
false.104 A court then issued an injunction, which was submitted 
to Google for deindexing of the newspaper article.105 If the Court 
of Appeal decision were upheld, Google would have had to dein-
dex the Ventura County Star article even though neither the Star 
nor Google had an opportunity to independently examine Saur-
man’s recantation. 
Likewise, consider Welter v. Does, an Arizona case filed by the 
law firm that filed the cases containing apparently forged nota-
rizations discussed in Part II. Megan Welter made the national 
news as an Iraq War veteran who became an Arizona Cardinals 
cheerleader,106 but then made the news again when she was ar-
rested for allegedly beating her boyfriend, Ryan McMahon.107 
                                         
103 Judgment, Ball v. Saurman, No. 56-2012-00518245-CU-
DF-VTA (Cal. Super. Ct. Ventura Cnty. filed Dec. 28, 2016), 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/CaVenturaBallvSaurman
.pdf. 
104 Id. 
105 https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13746934. 
106 See, e.g., Cardinals Cheerleader Also Iraq War Vet, Fox 
Sports (July 31, 2013), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/
arizona-cardinals-cheerleader-megan-welter-also-an-iraq-war-
vet-073113. 
107 See, e.g., Aditi Roy & Alexis Shaw, Arizona Cardinals 
Cheerleader Megan Welter Caught on Video Allegedly Attacking 
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Two years later, Welter filed a defamation lawsuit against 
McMahon, and McMahon submitted a stipulation saying that his 
original allegations were false.108 (It is impossible to tell from the 
record whether the signer of the stipulation was indeed the real 
Ryan McMahon, but let us assume that he was.) 
Welter then got an injunction stating that McMahon’s alleged-
ly defamatory statements were posted on ABC News, Fox Sports, 
CBS News, and USA Today, presumably because articles on 
those sites were based on those statements.109 And the injunction 
stated that defendant must take all actions, “including request-
ing removal of the URLs from all internet search engines . . . to 
remove all such webpages and cache from the Internet, such that 
the Content is rendered unsearchable.”110 Again, because this 
was a stipulated judgment, there was no factual determination of 
whether McMahon’s statements were actually defamatory. Yet 
under the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, Google would have had to 
deindex all those mainstream media articles. 
                                                                                                               
Boyfriend, ABC News (Aug. 3, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/
iraq-war-vet-turned-nfl-cheerleader-arrested-allegedly/story?id=
19861885. 
108 Stipulated Order for Perm. Inj., Welter v. Does, No. 
CV2016-004734 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty. June 29, 2016), 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/AzMaricopaWeltervDoes.
pdf. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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For another example of the same trick, see Desert Palm Surgi-
cal Group v. Petta, which was used to try to deindex a CNN Mon-
ey article.111 
C. Bury the URL: Attempts to Deindex Professional Media 
Articles By Listing Them Within a Long List of Other 
URLs 
Finally, trick three for deindexing professional media articles: 
Busy trial judges often just take proposed orders from parties and 
approve them. That may work well when there are real adver-
saries involved, and a defendant will alert the court to any prob-
lems with the plaintiff’s proposed order. But when a case is re-
solved by a default or stipulated judgment, no party may have an 
incentive to verify the legitimacy of all the URLs—and the judge 
might not be willing to do that, either. 
Consider, for instance, Flynn v. Garcia, where a stipulated 
judgment contains hundreds of URLs from “gripe sites” that let 
anonymous users post criticism about others.112 Buried among 
those sites (in the middle of the third page of URLs) is a single 
URL from Nevada’s largest circulating newspaper—Las Vegas 
Review-Journal: 
                                         
111 Desert Palm Surgical Group v. Petta, No. CV2008-010464 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty. June 13, 2016), http://www.law.
ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/AzMaricopaDesertPalmSurgicalGroupv
Petta. pdf. 
112 Stipulation & Order, Flynn v. Garcia, No. A-13-676559-C 
(Nev. Dist. Ct. Clark Cnty. Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/NvClarkFlynnvGarcia.pdf. 
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It is impossible, of course, to tell whether the Las Vegas Re-
view-Journal URL was deliberately buried in the proposed order, 
so that the judge would not notice it, or whether it was just in-
cluded alongside all the other URLs without any further thought 
on the lawyer’s part. But in any event, it seems likely that a 
judge, faced with a list of over a hundred URLs in a proposed de-
fault judgment, did not examine the list closely—and did not se-
riously consider whether the evidence presented really showed 
that all the URLs contained defamatory material. 
And again, this is just a sample; we see the same in: 
 Ramsthel v. Penny,113 another case from the firm involved 
in the forged notarization cases (Part II) and in Welter v. 
Does (Part VI.B), in which the final order listed 228 URLs, 
                                         
113 Order for Default Judgment, Ramsthel v. Penny, No. 
CV2014-093104 (Ariz. Maricopa Cnty. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/AzMaricopaRamsthelv
Penny.pdf. 
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including items on The Atlantic’s site The Wire (item 25) 
and on Yahoo News (item 38). 
 Generational Equity, LLC v. Does,114 where the plaintiff’s 
complaint and the eventual injunction include—buried 
deep within hundreds of other URLs—two articles in Inc., a 
prominent business magazine.115  
 Salle v. Marine Logistics, which contains 35 URLs includ-
ing (as #26) one for a 1997 Orlando Sentinel article.116  
 Kriss v. Reviewer, which includes the URL of a Miami Daily 
Business Review article (as #31 out of 43 URLs).117 
VII. Apparent Forgeries 
And then there are what seem to be the outright forgeries—
over 40 forged court orders submitted to Google (or, in a few in-
stances, WordPress or other sites) over the past four years. This 
includes 10 apparently forged California state court orders, over 
                                         
114 Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition, Generational Equity, 
LLC v. Does #1–100, No. 401-00232-2014, at 11–12 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 
Collin Cnty. Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/TxCollinGenerationalEquityvDoes.pdf; Second Judgment 
Modifying Order Granting Generational Equity’s Permanent In-
junction, id. 
115 Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition, id. 
116 Agreed Final Judgment & Permanent Injunction, Salle v. 
Marine Logistics, No. 50 2015 CA 004469 XXXX MB (Fla. 15th 
Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cnty. June 19, 2015), http://www.law.ucla. 
edu/volokh/hassell/FlPalmBeachSallevMarineLogisticsGroup.pdf. 
117 Order Granting Judgment & Entry of Permanent Injunc-
tion, Kriss v. Reviewer, No. A1502350 (Ohio Hamilton Cnty. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
OhHamiltonKrissvReviewer.pdf. 
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10 federal court orders, 12 Ohio state court orders, and others 
from other states. 
Some of the forgeries are obvious on their face, at least to 
those who know what to look for; here is the purported signature 
from a purported Los Angeles Superior Court order:118 
 
The forger apparently did not know that there are no Circuit 
Court Judges in Los Angeles Superior Court (though the title is 
common in other state trial court systems). 
But other forgeries are much more realistic, for instance:119 
                                         
118 http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12886152. 
119 http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2348455. 
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(Note that this might not have been the work of the lawyer cited 
in the caption; once someone has decided to forge everything else, 
why not fake the lawyer’s name as well?) 
Only examining court records can confirm whether the docu-
ment is authentic. Fortunately, the Los Angeles Superior Court 
has many of its records online, and they show that this case 
number corresponds to a completely different case, and there is 
no case involving a Jag Sitra Dior. Unfortunately, other courts 
(such as those in Plumas County and Mono County, where five of 
the orders are purportedly from) do not have online records sys-
tems. Checking on cases from such courts can require ordering 
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documents by mail, or in some courts even sending a courier ser-
vice. 
One such federal case led to a prosecution and conviction for 
forgery,120 though apparently with no publicity that might deter 
other forgers. Another federal case led to a federal prosecution 
that was just disclosed a month ago.121 Another state case led to a 
conviction for contempt of court.122 But many people appear to 
think that they can forge such takedown orders with impunity—
and the connections between some of the fake orders suggest that 
there are forgery businesses who do this for clients.123 
                                         
120 Complaint, United States v. Lichterman, No. 1:15-cr-00302-
JGK (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/FedSDNYUnitedStatesvLichterman.pdf; Judgment in a 
Criminal Case, ECF No. 36, id. (Feb. 22, 2016). 
121 Complaint, United States v. Arnstein, No. 1:17-mj-01870-
UA (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/04/
ArnsteinComplaint.pdf; Eugene Volokh, N.Y. businessman prose-
cuted for forging court orders to send to Google for deindexing, 
The Volokh Conspiracy (Wash. Post), Apr. 19, 2017, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/19/n-y-
businessman-prosecuted-for-forging-court-orders-to-send-to-
google-for-deindexing/. 
122 Judgment & Sentence for Indirect Criminal Contempt, 
Aukerman v. Adams, No. 2013-33765-FMCI (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. 
Volusia Cnty. Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/FlVolusiaAukermanvAdams.pdf. 
123 Compare, e.g., the Georgia Narconon v. Doe forgery, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12960667, with the Ohio Tranquil 
Rehab v. “Deathhamser” forgery, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=
12987034. Some of the forgeries are also based on the fake-
defendant orders discussed in Part I. Compare, e.g., the Maziar v. 
Garcia order, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=13449795, with 
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Fake orders, of course, would not be binding regardless of 
whether the Court of Appeal’s logic is affirmed. But their sheer 
brazenness, and their quantity, helps show what a large reservoir 
of potential fraud there is out there. Even if there are successful 
prosecutions that deter the outright forgers, the demand for such 
services will likely be channeled into some of the other schemes 
described earlier in this brief. It is thus especially important that 
Google, Yelp, and similar companies retain the flexibility to de-
cide that some purported orders are not trustworthy, whether be-
cause they appear to be forged or because they otherwise seem to 
be the result of an unreliable process. 
VIII. These Problems Cannot Be Solved by Requiring In-
ternet Companies to Intervene to Challenge Suspi-
cious Orders 
This brief has argued that Internet company discretion is the 
best (albeit imperfect) way of dealing with the epidemic of ques-
tionable court orders: Such discretion would leave companies free 
to investigate such submitted orders, including by requiring 
submitters to provide more information. Indeed, taking away this 
discretion would only worsen the epidemic, by giving unscrupu-
                                                                                                               
Smith v. Garcia, No. 16-144 S, 2017 WL 412722 (D.R.I. Jan. 31, 
2017). And one of the forgeries seemed to be for the benefit of the 
same person who was the plaintiff in one of the California-
notarization orders discussed in Part IV. Compare the 
Schwartzapfel v. Goldstein order, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=
1657779, with Schwartzapfel v. Guidry, No. 2014-42698 (Tex. 
Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. July 25, 2014), http://www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/TxHarrisSchwartzapfelvGuidry.pdf. 
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lous reputation management companies an especially strong in-
centive to do whatever it takes to get such an order. 
To be sure, in theory, there is an alternative way of dealing 
with this: requiring Internet companies to affirmatively intervene 
in a case to challenge a suspicious order, if they think they have a 
basis to doubt the order and therefore wish to avoid enforcing it. 
But in practice, this alternative is unlikely to help. 
Any such intervention would be difficult and expensive. It 
would require finding and engaging local counsel, who would 
need to write the motion to intervene, conduct possibly extensive 
discovery, attend hearings, further brief arguments, and so on. 
The bill could easily reach into the tens of thousands of dollars 
for any one case. Even if some of this money could be recouped as 
sanctions in the event that plaintiffs are found to have misbe-
haved in getting the order, much of the time the guilty parties 
will get away without providing full restitution; and some of the 
time the facts may be ambiguous, and no sanctions may be avail-
able. 
Moreover, such intervention may be practically largely pre-
cluded by procedural rules. Intervention in a case after a judg-
ment has been rendered is rare, and disfavored. In California, for 
example, a motion to intervene must be “timely,” Cal. Code Civ. 
Proc. § 387 (West 2017), which generally means that it is not al-
lowed after judgment, Morton Regent Enterprises, Inc. v. Leadtec 
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California, Inc. (1977) 74 Cal. App. 3d 842, 846.124 In Arizona, “a 
motion to intervene after judgment is considered timely only in 
extraordinary and unusual circumstances.” Weaver v. Synthes, 
Ltd. (U.S.A.) (Ct. App. 1989) 162 Ariz. 442, 446. 
Other jurisdictions have similar rules; for instance, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60 allows a judgment to be reopened be-
cause of “fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct,” but ex-
pressly provides that this may be done only “no more than a year 
after the entry of the judgment.”125 And because victorious plain-
tiffs have control over when to present an order to Google, they 
could deliberately wait until final judgment has been entered and 
any period for possible reopening has passed. 
These barriers, both legal and financial, would give Google, 
Yelp, and similar companies a strong incentive not to challenge 
orders submitted to them, if the orders were legally binding ab-
sent such a challenge. And there would be little countervailing 
incentive to bring challenges. After all, such a challenge would 
primarily benefit the author of the posted material, not Google or 
Yelp itself.  
                                         
124 Although Morton also notes that intervention is allowed af-
ter a default judgment where “default judgment was rendered . . . 
because of mistake, surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect,” 
74 Cal. App. 3d at 846, such an exception may not apply to stipu-
lated judgments. In addition, having to show legally adequate 
“mistake, surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect” would of-
ten require a great deal of effort and money.  
125 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (c)(1). 
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Legally, Google and Yelp do have First Amendment rights to 
communicate user-supplied material. Yelp Opening Br. on Merits 
28–34; Amici Curiae Br. of First Amendment & Internet Law 
Scholars. But practically speaking, they are unlikely to have any 
deep desire to spend tens of thousands of dollars just as a matter 
of principle.  
Occasionally, they may do so, as Yelp is doing in this very 
case, especially when they think they can establish a precedent 
that will protect their rights in many future cases. But if the 
Court of Appeal’s decision is accepted, and Google and Yelp are 
generally found to have a legal duty to comply with orders, there 
will be little benefit—and much cost—to their challenging any 
particular order. 
IX. Judicial Notice of Court Documents 
Most of the documents cited in this brief are complaints, or-
ders, or opinions; amicus asks this court to take notice of them 
under Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d). Amicus also asks this court to 
take notice of state online notary rolls, discussed in Part II, under 
Cal. Evid. Code § 452(c) (official acts of executive departments of 
any state). 
In certain places, though, the brief also mentions other infor-
mation. The most obvious example is the material in Part VII. 
This material has been submitted (mostly by Google) to the Lu-
men Database, which is run by the Berkman Klein Center for In-
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ternet & Society at Harvard University,126 so its content might be 
judicially noticeable under Cal. Evid. Code § 452(h) (“facts and 
propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are 
capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to 
sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy”). 
But beyond this, this court can consider the information 
about the court orders—as well as other assertions in the brief, 
such as about the apparent absence of certain defendants at the 
addresses stated in various complaints and stipulations, see, e.g., 
Part I—as “legislative facts.” The “adjudicative facts” related to 
what happened in the case under review (e.g., what Bird accused 
Hassell of, whether Hassell is guilty of that, and so on) must in-
deed be found within the record. But in determining the practical 
advantages and disadvantages of various alternative legal rules, 
courts routinely and necessarily rely on “legislative facts,” such 
as those included in academic research.  
As this Court noted in Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., it is 
proper to consider such facts “not to supplement the factual rec-
ord of the case,” “but only as [they bear] on the legal issue” in the 
case—there, the “existence of a duty of care in stopping alongside 
a freeway”; here, the propriety of binding Internet companies to 
injunctions on an aiding-and-abetting theory. 
In determining de novo what the law is, appellate 
courts routinely consider materials that were not in-
troduced at the trial, including publications contain-
                                         
126 Lumen, About Us, http://www.lumendatabase.org/pages/
about. 
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ing expressions of viewpoints and generalized state-
ments about the state of the world. These are consid-
ered not as a substitute for evidence but as an aid to 
the court’s work of interpreting, explaining and form-
ing the law. As the Law Revision Commission has 
explained, the Evidence Code does not restrict courts 
in their consideration of materials for the purpose of 
determining the law. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 
29B pt. 1 West's Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 
450, p. 420; see also Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Phys-
ical and Emotional Harm, § 7, com. b, p. 79 [“Courts 
determine legislative facts necessary to decide 
whether a no-duty rule is appropriate in a particular 
category of cases.”].)  
(2011) 51 Cal. 4th 764, 775, 248 P.3d 1170, 1177 n.5.  
For these reasons, amicus asks this Court either to take judi-
cial notice of, or to otherwise consider, the information that he 
has collected, and use it to inform this Court’s judgment about 
what would happen if Internet companies were required to com-
ply with orders to which they were not parties.127 These predic-
tions are in large part a matter of common sense, but legislative 
facts can be properly used to supplement “the basic generalized 
knowledge that a fact finder possesses regarding human affairs, 
and the way the world works.” California First Amend. Coalition 
v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 159, 174 (citing 9 Wig-
more on Evidence (1981) § 2565(b)). 
                                         
127 See Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 51 Cal. 4th at 775, 248 
P.3d at 1177 n.5 (noting that this Court could consider such infor-
mation “as background to our determination of the law without 
taking formal notice of it,” so that an express request for judicial 
notice of such information, “while not improper, was thus unnec-
essary”). 
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Of course, if this Court would like to gather facts on the prac-
tices that the brief describes, it could also appoint a special mas-
ter to take such evidence. See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Ct. 
8.252(c)(2)(B). (The special master could also be helpful if this 
Court concludes that some of the attempted frauds against Cali-
fornia courts outlined in this brief warrant attention from this 
Court.) Amicus would of course be happy to provide any such spe-
cial master with the records that he has gathered in his research. 
CONCLUSION 
It is said that “the principal purpose of the legal process,” as is 
practiced within an adversarial system such as ours, “is not to ob-
tain answers; it is to resolve disputes.” E.g., Michael J. Saks, En-
hancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication (1988) 51 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 243, 244. Whether or not this is an exaggeration 
in some cases, it is certainly the practice for stipulated and de-
fault judgments. If parties stipulate to some facts, the judge will 
not second-guess them. If a defendant chooses not to contest a 
case, the judge will generally accept the plaintiff’s factual claims, 
because the defendant has voluntarily absented himself from the 
dispute.128 
But while the result of these processes may be fair as between 
the parties, it should not be coercively imposed on third parties. 
                                         
128 “Because the default confesses those properly pleaded facts, 
a plaintiff has no responsibility to provide the court with suffi-
cient evidence to prove them—they are treated as true for pur-
poses of obtaining a default judgment.” Kim v. Westmoore Part-
ners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal. App. 4th 267, 281, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 
787. 
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It should not be imposed as a binding obligation on services such 
as Google, Yelp, or WordPress, when they are not parties to the 
litigation. It should not be imposed on authors whose posts people 
are trying to get removed or deindexed (but who often are not di-
rectly sued). And it should not be imposed on readers, who are 
denied the information in those posts—information that plaintiff 
may claim is libelous, but that has never been reliably deter-
mined to be libelous in a trustworthy adversarial process. 
A person “‘. . . is not bound by a judgment in personam in a lit-
igation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he 
has not been made a party by service of process.’ . . . This rule is 
part of our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should 
have his own day in court.’” Richard v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 
793, 798 (1996) (citations omitted). Some deep-rooted traditions 
may be foolish or outdated, but this one is wise.  
If the day in court belongs only to the plaintiffs, with the de-
fendants absent, colluding, or outright fake, the result will not 
just be unfair to impose on third parties: It will often lack any as-
surance of accuracy. The statement may have been “conclusively 
adjudged to be defamatory,” Hassell Br. 14, as between the par-
ties. But there is no basis to view it as conclusive on third par-
ties—and plenty of basis, as this brief has shown, to view such 
adjudications with great skepticism. 
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APPENDIX A. LAWSUITS THAT SHARE PROCEDURAL 
AND TEXTUAL FEATURES WITH SMITH V. GARCIA AND 
PATEL V. CHEN 
1. Glatter v. Castle, No. SC125890 (Cal. L.A. Super. Ct. 
injunction issued June 24, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/CaLosAngelesGlattervCastle.pdf. 
2. Glatter v. Castle, No. 184324 (Cal. Shasta Super. Ct. filed 
Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
CaShastaGlattervCastle.pdf. 
3. Lyman v. Bernard, No. LC104275 (Cal. L.A. Super. Ct. in-
junction issued June 22, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/CaLosAngelesLymanvBernard.pdf. 
4. Serenbetz v. McDonald, No. BC621992 (Cal. L.A. Super. Ct. 
dismissed June 27, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/CaLosAngelesSerenbetzvMcDonald.pdf. 
5. Williams v. Li, No. L15-03752 (Cal. Contra Costa Super. Ct. 
injunction issued Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/CaContraCostaWilliamsvLi.pdf. 
6. Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-021440-CA-01 (Fla. Miami-Dade 
Cnty. Cir. Ct. dismissed Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/FlMiamiDadeCartervQuinn.pdf. 
7. Cast v. Pawloski, No. 2016-CH-09649 (Ill. Cook Cnty. Cir. 
Ct. complaint filed Jul. 22, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/IlCookCastvPawloski.pdf. 
8. Jones v. Conti¸ No. 24C15006945 (Md. Baltimore City Cir. 
Ct. injunction issued Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/MdBaltimoreJonesvConti.pdf. 
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9. Norbu v. Campbell, No. 24C1600250 (Md. Baltimore City 
Cir. Ct. dismissed June 2, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/MdBaltimoreNorbuvCampbell.pdf. 
10. Patel v. Chan, No. 24C16003573 (Md. Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 
injunction issued July 22, 2016, Motion to Intervene, Motion 
to Strike Judgment and Answer to Defendant’s Motion to 
Vacate Consent Judgment/Order filed Sept. 21, 2016), http://
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/MdBaltimorePatelvChan.
pdf. 
11. Ruddie v. Kirschner, No. 24C15005620 (Md. Baltimore City 
Cir. Ct. injunction issued Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.law.
ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/MdBaltimoreRuddievKirschner.pdf. 
12. Tanoto v. Brown, No. 24C16000901 (Md. Baltimore City Cir. 
Ct. dismissed July 8, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
hassell/MdBaltimoreTanotovBrown.pdf. 
13. Hanna v. Garcia, No. 12C161705 (Md. Harford Cnty. Cir. Ct. 
injunction issued June 27, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/MdHarfordHannavGarcia.pdf. 
14. Norbu v. Campbell, No. 12C161959 (Md. Harford Cnty. Cir. 
Ct. injunction issued July 15, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.
edu/volokh/hassell/MdHarfordNorbuvCampbell.pdf. 
15. Tanoto v. Brown, No. 12C161958 (Md. Harford Cnty. Cir. Ct. 
injunction issued July 18, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/MdHarfordTanotovBrown.pdf. 
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16. Mohlman v. Jones, No. 13C16107924 (Md. Howard Cnty. 
Cir. Ct. injunction denied June 15, 2016), http://www.law.
ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/MdHowardMohlmanvJones.pdf. 
17. Benedict v. Matthews, No. A16738922C (Nev. Clark Cnty. 
Dist. Ct. injunction issued July 8, 2016), http://www.law.
ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/NvClarkBenedictvMatthews.pdf. 
18. Horner v. Davis, No. A16738996C (Nev. Clark Cnty. Dist. Ct. 
filed June 23, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
NvClarkHornervDavis.pdf. 
19. Callagy v. Roffman, No. 160603108 (Pa. Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. 
injunction issued July 1, 2016, vacated Oct. 20, 2016), http://
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/PaPhiladelphiaCallagyvRo
ffman.pdf. 
20. Murtagh v. Reynolds, No. 160901262 (Pa. Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. 
injunction denied and docket entered Oct. 26, 2016), http:// 
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/PaPhiladelphiaMurtaghv
Reynolds.pdf. 
21. Nelson v. Spear, No. 160600824 (Pa. Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. filed 
June 14, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
PaPhiladelphiaNelsonvSpear.pdf. 
22. Talson v. Martinez, No. 160603109 (Pa. Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. 
injunction granted July 1, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/
volokh/hassell/PaPhiladelphiaTalsonvMartinez.pdf. 
23. Olea v. James, No. 2016-49734 (Tex. Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct. 
filed July 27, 2016), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
TxHarrisOleavJames.pdf. 
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24. Smith v. Garcia, No. CA16-144, 2017 WL 412722 (D.R.I. in-
junction issued Apr. 22, 2016, vacated Jan. 31, 2017), http:// 
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/FedDRISmithvGarcia.pdf. 
25. Mohlman v. Jones, No. H-16-0274 (S.D. Tex. dismissed sua 
sponte on grounds of lack of diversity Feb. 4, 2016), http://
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/FedSDTexMohlmanvJones
.pdf.  
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APPENDIX B. APPARENT FORGERIES 
1. California, Contra Costa County: Pewzner v. Quigley, 
http://lumendatabase.org/notices/14081118. 
2. California, Los Angeles County: Dior v. Xyz, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2348455. 
3. California, Los Angeles County: Morris v. TheDirty, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2233687. 
4. California, Los Angeles County: Morris v. Bail Bond City, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12886152. 
5. California, Los Angeles County: Morris v. Bail Bond City, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12913153. 
6. California, Mono County: Khorasani v. Sampson, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1037493. 
7. California, Mono County: Giunta v. Bosley, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1896816. 
8. California, Plumas County: Increase Visibility v. Ruiz, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2164422. 
9. California, Plumas County: Increase Visibility v. Thomas, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2174997. 
10. California, Plumas County: Schwartzapfel v. Goldstein, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1657779. 
11. Connecticut: Haas v. Berriault, 
http://lumendatabase.org/notices/14045627. 
12. Federal, C.D. Cal.: United States v. Fontaine, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1619482. 
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13. Federal, D.R.I.: Maziar v. Garcia, http://lumendatabase.
org/?sid=13449795. 
14. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12549270. (Eleven different 
apparently forged orders were submitted, all supposedly in 
this case; links for all are given below.) 
15. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=13298449. 
16. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2133902. 
17. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2152164. 
18. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2168617. 
19. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2199690. 
20. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2212810. 
21. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2223326. 
22. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2288949. 
23. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2296050. 
24. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Arnstein v. Transpacific Software, 
http://lumendatabase.org/notices/13844954. 
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25. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Abshier v. Sunset Recordings, discussed 
in United States v. Lichterman, No. 1:15-cr-00302-JGK (S.D. 
N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
FedSDNYUnitedStatesvLichterman.pdf. 
26. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Sunset Recordings v. Zdrakov, included in 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/FedSDNYAbshierv
SunsetRecordings2.pdf. 
27. Federal, S.D. Tex.: Iyogi v. Beeting, http://lumendatabase. 
org/?sid=2029935. 
28. Florida, Volusia County: Aukerman v. Adams, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1426171. 
29. Georgia, Fulton County: Narconon v. Doe, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12960667. 
30. Illinois, Cook County: People v. Cordogan, 
http://lumendatabase.org/notices/13555164. 
31. Maryland, Baltimore City: Luna v. Munoz, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2360003. 
32. Ohio, Hamilton County: Asia Pacific v. Chen, http://www.
law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/OhioHamiltonAsiaPacificvChen. 
pdf. 
33. Ohio, Hamilton County: American Truck Group v. Your Sa-
vior, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2350253. 
34. Ohio, Hamilton County: Capital Gold Group v. Ripoff Re-
port, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2256029. 
35. Ohio, Hamilton County: Clarkson v. Ali, 
http://lumendatabase.org/notices/14041069. 
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36. Ohio, Hamilton County: Friedman v. Wright, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2368931. 
37. Ohio, Hamilton County: Intacapital Swiss v. Ilrglegal, 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/hassell/
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